vince it to release the captured crew and ship. But the Soviet influence proved a mirage, as Pyongyang stood firm in the face of Soviet pressure and the American show of force. Slowly, the Americans realized that North Korea might not be the puppet regime they had assumed it to be. This rude awakening was followed, a few years later, by the publication of Communism in Korea. The authors, Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, provided an alternate viewpoint to the prevailing American perception of North Korea: Kim Il Sung was not a mere puppet enthroned by the Soviets, but a leader comparable to many other communists who had actively struggled for liberation against Japanese imperialism. However, the book went only so far as to provide a "relativistic" study ofthe DPRK, and stopped short oftracing North Korea's historical roots and postwar experiences in order to account for Pyongyang's defiance in the Pueblo incident and subsequent events. In the end, both Communism in Korea and subsequent works about the North fail to come to terms -with juche, the guiding principle that defines the DPRK as independent of outside pressures, insistent on its own ways, and master of its own fate.
This article seeks to trace the early historical origins of North Korea's political institutions centered onjuche. In the current polarized atmosphere, which allows only a pro-or anti-North narrative, it is not easy to advance an alternate understanding of the division of the Korean peninsula and the establishment of the DPRK.1 Fortunately, two recent developments help the task. First, one can draw guidance from the emerging literature on the early periods of the DPRK-even though many studies remain cursory and partial-produced in particular by a new generation of scholars in the United States and South Korea. Second, the opening of previously unavailable new sources, such as the Japanese Imperial Police records and the Records Seized by U.S. Military Forces in Korea during the Korean War, reveals a great deal about the origins and character ofthe formation ofthe North Korean government. Many conventional accounts have ignored these documents.2
This article rejects both the "sovietization" arguments popular in the United States and South Korea, and the "self-powered revolution" thesis advanced by the North's scholars and official narratives. Instead, it articulates a synthetic perspective that the North's state formation is best understood as the outcome ofrecursive interactions between outsiders, who sought to exercise their influence to shape the North, and Koreans, particularly Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese guerilla group, who struggled to maintain their autonomy. The North's juche state emerged from this tug-of-war. After addressing the period from the genesis ofthe Korean communist movement to the anti-Japanese armed struggles of the 1930s, this article presents the circumstances under which the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit emerged as the center of North Korean politics, and established a nation in the midst of the international politics of cooperation and conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. To condense the discussion ofthe issues ofthe liberation period, this article is limited to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and to minju kijiron (democratic base argument).
Finally, the article situates the emergence ofthe North's political institutions in the still-unexplored historical context of North Korean-Soviet struggles over "unity" and "subordination," "autonomy" and "creation."
"SOVIETIZATION" OR "SELF-POWERED REVOLUTION"?
The United States Military Government in Korea first introduced the perspective of the postliberation North Korean government as a "satellite state"
or "puppet" of the Soviet Union. As early as September 29, 1945 , an American official described the situation in the North as "sovietization":
In the meantime, there is little knowledge of the political actions or policies of the Russian occupation forces to the north. They have ejected the Japanese and set up local governments, which are strictly on a one-party basis. There is more than a probability that they will sovietize northern Korea as they sovietized Eastern Europe.3 This view was further strengthened by studies produced by U.S. government agencies and Korea scholars alike. The Department of State, for instance, in a study produced on the basis of the materials and testimonies collected in North Korea in late 1950, characterized the North's regime as a "Soviet satellite."4 The sovietization theory, which American academia had originally developed in the context of Eastern Europe, was systematically applied to North Korea by such scholars as Yang Homin, Dae-sook Suh, Robert Scalapino, Chong-sik Lee, and Erik van Ree. The sovietization theory provided a conceptual framework within which these scholars made sense of their respective observations of the DPRK.5 To the Americans waging the Cold War, the sovietization theory made it seem obvious that the North Korean government was not an autonomous actor and that the Soviet Union was responsible for directing the division of the Korean peninsula.
Many facts on the ground, of course, coalesced to lend credence to the sovietization theory. At the end of World War II, the Soviet military advanced into northern Korea, and remained the occupation force there for a few years, steering the newly established regime toward a Stalinist developmental model. Beginning from the period of anti-Japanese armed struggle, the North Korean communists, led by Kim Il Sung, had a history of supporting the Soviet Union under such slogans as, "Let us protect the Soviet Union with arms!" Furthermore, the North Koreans desired a new political system-one that differed from bourgeois democracy-and an economic system that was guided not by the market but by planning, and not by capitalist profit motives but by aspirations to elevate the standard of living. As a result, the sovietization theory ended up the only, and the most convincing, conceptual road map to understanding North Korea.
The sovietization theory, however, had a number of serious flaws. To begin with, the North Korean government was not the same "freight car government" as many governments in Eastern Europe. Not only did Korean communists have popular support in the North, but they also carefully maintained a distance from the Soviet occupation force from the start. Even in the ravages of the post-Korean War period, Pyongyang maintained its defiance toward both its wartime enemy, Washington, and its ally, Moscow. Pyongyang was feisty enough, even then, to earn the rare distinction ofbeing labeled by Moscow (long before George W. Bush used the same label half a century later) as "a rogue state-the last country with a Stalinist system and surely the most isolated country in the world." North Korea may be many things, but a Soviet satellite is not one of them.
If the United States, and South Korea, are gripped by the sovietization theory, North Korea offers an opposite view. Early on, scholars in the North developed thejuche theory, which explained the North's regime formation in terms of indigenous "people's democratic revolution."6 The North offers this as its official narrative, tracing the historical roots of the regime back to the anti-Japanese armed struggle that Kim Il Sung organized and led.7 According to the official rendering, the DPRK resulted from the "Arduous March" carried out by the anti-Japanese guerrillas who had waged an armed liberation struggle, independent of Chinese or Soviet communists. Outside assistance is rarely acknowledged, as if any admission of help would compromise the purity of the indigenous, self-reliant struggle that founded and sustained the country.
The North's official narratives, however, run into difficulties,just as American sovietization theory does. North Korean scholars do not provide the details of the actions taken by Kim Il Sung's guerrilla unit immediately before and after it moved into North Korea, for fear that such details could expose the limits of the "self-powered revolution" theory. Nor do they discuss, for the same reasons, the influences exercised and the changes forced by the Soviet Union. The North's official history betrays a well-orchestrated selection bias about uncomfortable facts-for example, about the separate elections held in 1948, lest Pyongyang be accused of having pushed for establishing a separate government, thereby consolidating the Korean division. Moreover, one often encounters the refrain that a gap between Pyongyang's stated policy goals and actual results was bridged thanks to the individual genius of Kim Il Sung.
This article seeks not to explicate the uniqueness ofan individual but to analyze the social structure and the course ofhistory that facilitated the formation of the North Korean authority structure. In analyzing the establishment of the North Korean system, one must avoid sliding into either the sovietization or the self-powered revolution perspective, both of which necessarily place a one-sided emphasis on a particular aspect ofwhat is inherently a complex interaction between divergent actors. The North's current economic crisis provides a case in point of these two perspectives, neither of which entirely explains the problem at hand. For example, scholars from South Korea and the United States, who emphasize the North's dependence on outsiders, explain the economic crisis in terms of internal problems with the North's "self-powered revolution." Scholars in North Korea, by contrast, who underline the self-reliance in their systems, locate the causes oftheir economic difficulties in outside factors. In order to develop a coherent, cohesive argument, therefore, this article seeks to go beyond such one-sided frameworks.
In the early 1990s, a new kind of literature emerged, which recognized both the forcible influence of the Soviets and the internal dynamics of North Korean society, synthesizing the two to explicate the North's developmental Japanese colonial control, the backwardness of the Korean socioeconomic structure, and the sin kukka könsöl undong (new nation-building movement). Thanks to their efforts, the process of state formation between September 9, 1948 is now better understood. 9 To advance our understanding further, it is important to trace historically the social conditions that the anti-Japanese guerrilla army-the chief player involved in state formation-inherited. Likewise, a synthetic perspective is still needed, one that explains the North's state formation as a dynamic process of internal and external factors caught in a recursive causal relationship. The failure of existing works to explain the North's resiliency highlights this need. Ifthe North is, as some current scholarship argues, a government established and sustained by the Soviet Union, why did it not collapse with the Soviet Union, as did many other Soviet "satellites" in Eastern Europe? How is it that the North, the Soviet Union's supposed erstwhile puppet regime, now accuses Moscow of revisionism, and calls for "a struggle against revisionism"? At the same time, how is it that the North, purportedly a selfreliant country, depends so heavily on outside inputs that, in their absence, its agriculture collapses? Any explanation ofthe North's state formation must confront these issues.
The North Korean people feared the Soviet army from the very first day of its arrival, and even the Korean communists maintained a tenuous relationship with it. The Soviet army arrived as an occupation force, and made that fact known to the Koreans by handing out orders and directives. The Soviet army plundered the North's economy, threatening the livelihood of average citizens, and freely wielded its military power, endangering their lives.10 While criminal acts committed by individual Soviet soldiers did not last long, the Soviet Union continued to expropriate industrial facilities, for example, disassembling and shipping to the Soviet Union the electric generators from the largest power plant, Sup'ung, in what was then Korea. This activity was carried out, allegedly, to collect war indemnities from none other than Japan. The size of Soviet expropriation can be inferred from a Soviet report that acknowledges that the occupation command directly controlled production at thirty-eight heavy-industry factories, and-for the five months alone that the report covers-shipped 8,535 tons of goods from these factories to the Soviet Union without compensation.11
Although the Soviet Union sought to establish joint ventures, the Chosön-Soviet Marine Company and the Chosön-Soviet Petroleum Company were representative ofwhat happened between the two countries. These companies were a tool for the Soviets to gain control, without extensive investments, of the North's main industries, and to supply the Soviet Union with northern Korean resources and products. The Soviets even attempted to lease the three ports of Ch'öngjin, Najin, and Unggi in the same way the British had earlier "leased" Hong Kong. Most of the loans provided by the Soviet Union were designed "to strengthen the Soviets' economic position in the North." In the end, the loans were used to pay for the expenses that the Soviets incurred in producing goods in the factories their army had seized, and to ship them back to the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not pay compensation for the northern Korean goods they took.12
The North Koreans reacted in a predictable manner.13 They viewed the Soviets with contempt, so much so that rosúkke, or "Ruskies," became a derogatory term. These feelings ofbetrayal and resentment provided the seeds from which patriotic slogans grew and spread. One of the popularized slogans called upon the northern Korean people to uphold their national identity: "even though we read foreign writings, our mind must be rooted in our own country." From this societywide resentment and contempt, thejuche ethos developed. In opposition to the Soviet other, the northern Korean nation was born.
On November 3, 1946, for the first time on the Korean peninsula, the northern Korean people participated in regular elections for provincial, city, and county people's committees. After the North Korean People's Committee was established in February 22, 1947, the Koreans increasingly exercised their decision-making power and expressed their identity more assertively, with little regard for Soviet influence. This shifting balance of power in North Korean-Soviet relations can be seen through the lens of changes in the amount of Soviet literature that was translated and published in North Korea during this period.
As table 1 shows, the number of translated publications, produced by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and the Choso munhwa hyöphoe (Korea-Soviet Cultural Association), increased dramatically from 1946 to 1947,14 but decreased considerably in 1948. At that time, the Soviet Union was energetically promoting to the world the superiority of its socialist system, and North Korea was in a position to receive Soviet "advanced culture." The decrease in translation and publication of Soviet literature, therefore, reflected a fall in Soviet influence within North Korea. Moreover, the decline in Marxist-Leninist publications, combined with the fact that the Workers' Party had "a very small number of Marxist ideologues,"15 provided fertile ground for "Korean style" thinking and national ideology to take root.
The 1950s was a trying time for the North Korean people. Having suffered an unparalleled level of devastation during the Korean War, they were left with the unenviable challenges of reconstruction from the ashes. Their challenges were further complicated by the Soviet refusal to provide much-needed assistance. 16 The Koreans became increasingly resentful as they considered the Soviets' behavior as a betrayal of the struggling North Korean populace.17 With Khrushchev's ascendance, North Korean-Soviet relations soured further. The Soviet Union utilized its great power status and exercised pressure to interfere in North Korean internal affairs. As Pyongyang resisted, Moscow accused the defiant regime of being a "closed society" and an "isolationist," using the very same terms that the West would invoke, decades later, to criticize the North.18 In response, from the mid-to late-1950s, the North Korean government characterized Soviet interference in its affairs as "modern revisionism." Its opposition to this revisionism created the necessary momentum to establish thejuche principle of doing things "our way." As a result, North Korea developed a unique system, different from those ofother Eastern European socialist states. While North Korea may share some ofthe basic features ofthe modern state and some ofthe characteristics common to socialist states, its distinguishing characteristics resulted from its early interactions with the Soviet Union. Only in the historical context of the North's struggles against both its "main enemy," the United States, and its supposed patron, the Soviet Union, can one begin to understand the DPRK's emphasis on centralization around the leader, "revolutionary achievements and traditions," successor strategy, and the "art of leadership.'"9 In short,juche, as North Korea's central institution, emerged as much in opposition to the Soviet Union as in accordance with it.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Modernity in Western Europe is characterized by inter alia, the formation of the nation-state, the rise of capitalism, and the ideological formation of individualism and liberty. Modernity on the Korean peninsula, in contrast, has been marked by the struggle to achieve sovereignty from the colonization of Japanese imperialism, the development of a colonial-semifeudal society, and the ideological formation of collectivism. Because the Korean state did not emerge out of the developmental differentiation process of a civil society, as Western European states did, Koreans, both in the North and South, distinguish two periods of modernity: kúndae (recent times) and hyöndae (contemporary times).
The North Korean state emerged out ofthe following three historical developments: (1) Korean communists' long-term movement to build a system of proletarian dictatorship, and particularly, the Kim Il Sung faction's success in consolidating political organizations through the anti-Japanese armed struggle; (2) The political basis for and historical origins of the inevitable formation of separate states on the Korean peninsula can be found first within the Korean communist movement. Even though the Comintern withdrew its recognition of the Korean Communist Party as a branch in late 1928, Korean communists continued their underground activities through mass-based organizations, such as revolutionary trade unions and peasant associations. Their task was helped by the high degree to which socialist ideology resonated with traditional peasant reform thought, as well as sentiments of the laborers and peasants exploited under Japanese colonialism. Nonetheless, until 1945, the communists failed to establish a clear central organization that would lead the effort to establish a new state. The communist organizations had played few roles in the struggle to gain sovereignty, and exerted only limited influence over the labor unions and peasant associations' individual activities.
After the failure of the March First movement (samil undong) in 1919, the center ofthe independence movement gravitated toward anti-Japanese armed struggles, and militant activities by the early Independence Army movement, the National Liberation Army, the Korean Volunteers' Corps, and the antiJapanese guerrilla unit of Kim Il Sung all grew in force. Through its longstanding struggle, Kim Il Sung's group developed from the Anti-Japanese People's Guerilla Army into the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. For a number of important reasons, it emerged as a powerful political force equipped with the ideological foundation necessary to establish the People's state power (inmin chöngkwöri).
24Gwang-Oon Kim First, Kim Il Sung was famous for his anti-Japanese armed struggle during the 1930s. After liberation, he was welcomed back to Korea in triumph as the "lodestar of national liberation" and a legendary hero. The Kim Il Sung group gained its popularity by winning highly publicized victories such as the Poch'önbo battle of June 4, 1937 , while communists like Pak Hönyöng were not well known to the public because their activities had been mostly underground.
Second, because the anti-Japanese guerrillas began party activities as members of the Chinese Communist Party, and because after 1940 they were under the Soviet Far East Command, their activities were limited mainly to party-building projects. But turning that limit into an advantage, they actively engaged in organizing party cells in many local communities, which ultimately expanded and strengthened their influence.20 Unlike Pak Hönyöng-who after liberation gathered his people and tried to consolidate his power in the national center of Seoul-Kim Il Sung continued his practice of establishing his bases in the provinces, in order to propagate his influence and eventually to envelop and seize the center.21
Third, the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit had developed a more coherent identity than other political groups inside or outside Korea at the time. They had drawn particular confidence from the fact that they had successfully overcome the brutal "anti-Minsaengdan campaign"22 and the "Arduous March,"23 and this confidence distinguished them from other communist groups. After liberation, they promoted their experiences as "revolutionary character and discipline," elevating them as the normative standard for political groups vying for power, with far-reaching consequences.24 On the one hand, this characterization led to factional fights because other communist or nationalist groups who had also participated in the national liberation movement25 were not as highly valued as the anti-Japanese guerrillas and their early followers. On the other hand, it resulted in the tendency to rely upon and promote as the North's power elites the graduates ofMan'gyöngdae hyöngmyöng hagwön (Man'gyöngdae Revolutionary School) that was attended mostly by the guerillas' descendants.
Fourth, the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit had the experience of establishing a guerrilla base and forming a mass organization under difficult conditions.26 As will be discussed later, this experience laid the basis for the "democratic revolutionary base" thesis thatjustified establishing a separate government in the North, and consolidated the division.
Fifth, the anti-Japanese guerrillas' experience guided their tactical decisions in the process of creating the Korean People's Army. They first formed small units in the provinces and then integrated them into a single, large army with an official announcement. Although the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit made compromises with, and even concessions to, other factions, taking secondary positions in many government bureaucracies, it directly controlled the military under all circumstances. It accepted the tactical maneuvering because it had learned from its own guerilla experiences what Mao later popularized: that power comes from the barrel of a gun.27 The origin of the sön'gun ("military-first") concept, commonly heard in today's North Korea, can be traced to the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit's practices during this period.
Sixth, Kim Il Sung drew on his alliance-building experiences to formulate the policy to construct a mass-based united front in postliberation North Korea. During the anti-Japanese campaigns, Kim's group assiduously worked to establish an anti-imperialist united front, with all forces-regardless of their class backgrounds or regional origins-fighting the Japanese forces.28 Encouraged by his success on this score, Kim established a party activity principle to construct a "united democratic national front" based on a labor-peasant alliance, and developed policies that privileged the masses over elites, and the masses' subjective state over their material conditions. These principles were later formalized in such catchphrases as, "Work is done by people, but revolution is carried out by the masses," and, "Revolution is not achieved by people's social origin, but by people's thought."
Not only did Kim's group adroitly exploit its long and arduous anti-Japanese armed struggle to legitimize its gradual accumulation ofpower, but it also elevated these six points as the unique internal operating principles of the North Korean state. In time, these six characteristics became so institutionalized that they collectively became both the basis for Kim's partisan unit over the next sixty years, and the mechanism that reproduced its centralized power. With a heavy dose of skepticism, the CCP remarked of the Korean communists: "although much energy has been expended on the Korean movement in Manchuria from the past to the present, the harvest has not only been little but the ideological domain has been weak." In particular, people associated with the "ML" (Marxist-Leninist) group were singled out as a potential source of factionalism, with the CCP going so far as to ban them from taking leadership positions in the party.29
Kim Il Sung, in contrast, held a high-profile position in the CCP and built a successful rapport with his Chinese comrades.30 Kim Il Sung participated 26Gwang-Oon Kim in the establishment ofthe Anti-Japanese Allied Army, an integrated military unit with Korean and Chinese soldiers, and worked with Chinese communists to establish the Anti-Imperialist United Front. The CCP viewed him as a leader who was "cool under pressure, clever, and an admirable commander."31 Zhou Baozhong went so far as to report to the Soviet Army Far East Command that "Kim Il Sung is an excellent military commander . . . among the Korean comrades in the Chinese Communist Party, he is quite superior. He can perform important duties in southern Manchuria, east ofthe Amnok River, and in northern Korea."32
The experiences ofKim Il Sung and his colleagues in the CCP were widely applied in postliberation North Korea. The bonds of kinship, forged in this period, continued to provide an important foundation for the ideological, and sometimes personal, solidarity between the CCP and the North Korean government.33 Furthermore, without the support of the CCP and People's Republic of China, it would have been much more difficult for the North Korean government to maintain its independence from the Soviet Union, and North Korea's fate, as a consequence, would have been closer to that of the Eastern European countries whose autonomy was compromised.
October 23, 1940, marked a turning point in Kim's relations with foreign communists, as his guerrilla unit moved to the Khabarovsk area ofthe Soviet Union. Kim established temporary bases in the Mt. Paektu area and in the fareastern region of Siberia to direct small-unit actions in Korea and in southeast Manchuria. While staying in the Soviet Union, he frequently met with the commander of the First Far East Allied Army of the Soviet Union, K. A. Merichikov; and the military committee member, T. F. Shtikov. Kim Il Sung visited Moscow before the Soviet Union opened hostilities against Japan and also met with A. Zhukov, supreme commander of the Soviet occupation army of Germany and Soviet representative to the Germany occupation authority, and with A. Zhdanov, the political affairs bureau secretary for the Soviet Communist Party.34 Meeting with top Soviet leaders and those responsible for practical administration was an important political step for Kim Il Sung, who would of course later become the leader ofNorth Korea. The Soviets had a chance to personally assess Kim Il Sung's capacity as a leader, and their appreciation of his merits led them to provide him with the means to control the political situation in postliberation North Korea.
The Soviet Entry into the War and the Division and Occupation of the Korean Peninsula
While it is commonly recognized that the entry ofthe Soviet Union into World War II contributed not only to the destruction ofthe Japanese Kwantung Army but also to the division of the Korean peninsula, there has been some uncertainty about Soviet reaction to the General Order No. 1 issued by General MacArthur. A recently unearthed document largely dispels this uncertainty. In a personal, secret letter to President Truman, Stalin was explicit about his agreement with the General Order that divided the Korean peninsula:
I in general agree with the contents of General Order No. 1 that you just sent to me, provided that Dairen is part of the Manchurian region. But I suggest the following items be revised. 1) In the territories returned by the Japanese Army to the Soviet Army, the Kuril Islands should be included in the decision of the Allied powers, 2) . . . 35 Stalin not only wanted to acquire Dairen (Dalian) and the section of the Korean peninsula above the 38th parallel, but he also wanted the Kuril Islands. He had no problem with dividing the Korean peninsula.36 Stalin's order of September 20, 1945, further reveals that he was not just agreeing to Korea's division: he was also trying to install a pro-Soviet government in the north above the 38th parallel.
Subsequent events, however, show that Stalin's intentions were not easily implemented. Rather, Soviets and North Koreans found themselves in a complex interplay as they tried to negotiate through the revolutionary turmoil of the postliberation period. The Soviet Union immediately established a civil government in its "expanded area" and placed a police affairs command in each region, but it lacked the power to exercise complete control in the North.37 As Koreans formed the people's committees,38 the Soviet Union approved, ex post facto, "the direct participation of people from the communist party and the bourgeois nationalist movement" and attempted to unite them under the "leadership of the Red Army High Command."39 Afterward, the Soviets followed a pragmatic course as they went along and condoned the Koreans' autonomous political activities. As a result, even though the Koreans were under strong Soviet influence, they still enjoyed considerable latitude to oversee their own affairs. The Korean communists adopted a Soviet-style developmental model, for example, but they adapted it to their circumstances to such an extent that it became thejuche model-not only different from the Soviet framework but also independent of its influence.40
As the power balance was shifting within the North, an equally important change occurred at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in December 1945, where Korea's fate was being discussed.41 At the conference, the United States proposed a four-nation trusteeship, in which the superiority of the three (United States, Great Britain, and China) would dominate the one (Soviet Union).42 The Soviet proposal, by contrast, centered on the establishment, by the Koreans, of a Korean provisional government.43 These different proposals paralleled the different political situations in South and North Korea. In the South, the American military government maintained control in collaboration with minority right-wing politicians. In the north, Koreans were not merely included in the North Korean Administration's ten major bureau offices, but were actually leading the political development in cooperation with the Soviets.44
On December 27, 1945, the Moscow Conference agreed to resolve the Korean issue along lines that largely followed the Soviet proposal.45 The Moscow Resolution made at least two things clear about the relations between Korea and the rest of the world. First, it substituted a clear statement about Korea's independence for the vagueness of the 1943 Cairo Declaration that Korea would be given its independence "in due course." Second, it portended that the United States and the Soviet Union would now directly influence Korea's future.
The Moscow decision marked a departure from the continual state of divided occupation between the north and the south.46 By the time the conference was convened, the United States and the Soviet Union had already unilaterally implemented their occupation policies for a period of three or four months. Based on the previously constituted circumstances, the discussion of the Korean issue could begin because each side had already established a foundation for implementing their own policies. Maintaining the facade of the wartime alliance, the two sides acted as if they were interested in establishing a unified Korean state, but their real intentions were completely different.
In a March 1946 telegram to the U.S. Secretary of State, C. W. Thayer, an American political adviser in Korea, unequivocally endorsed a separate government in the South as a "realistic and wise" policy: [T] he purpose of American policy towards Korea is not for Korean independence, but it must be to block Soviet control of Korea . . . pushing a policy for the establishment of a strong anti-Soviet, pro-American right-wing government in the south is realistic and wise.47
Following Secretary of State George Marshall's directive to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson to "prepare a draft policy to create a separate government in the south" in January 1947,48 the United States proposed to Russia that the boundary on the Korean peninsula be clearly drawn. 49 As the Truman Doctrine caused the Cold War to intensify, the transfer ofthe Korean issue to the United Nations presaged the tragedy of permanent division and internecine conflict. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately forced the establishment of separate governments in North and South Korea. If the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers unambiguously presented the international situation surrounding the Korean peninsula, then minju kijiron (democratic base argument) effectively expressed North Korean cognizance of the state of affairs, as well as their counterstrategy. The North Korean communists were attempting to assert the country's juche-rather than act passively-under the international circumstances that were marginalizing Korean voice.
At the beginning ofhis political activity, Kim II Sung spoke in obscure terms about the minju kiji nosön (democratic base line).50 In a report, he stated that "even if only in the northern Korean region where the freedom of democratic activity is guaranteed, the urgent task is to make northern Korea the base for Korean democratic development by laying the political, economic, and cultural foundation for the future Democratic People's Republic."51 The sixteenth clause ofthe communiqué of the inaugural meeting ofthe Communist Party ofNorth Korea also alluded to the "unique character of northern Korea."
An offensive initiated to some extent by the Korean communists, the goal ofthe minju kiji nosön was to achieve a revolution in the whole Korea by first establishing the northern region as the support area and revolutionary base for the Korean communist movement. At the same time, it was a defensive reaction to ongoing international developments: the party's central leadership institutions were located in Pyongyang as a precautionary strategy against potential attacks by the United States or other emergencies. 52 In 1945, clear statements about the "revolutionary base" and "democratic base" were not well publicized, but the situational understanding and strategic line of the northern communists were clearly predicated on the policy of establishing the democratic base. The northern communists made their stance public at the founding of the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party. In other words, it is impossible to understand the democratic base line without also considering the establishment of the North Korean Branch Bureau.
THE CHANGE IN NORTH KOREAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
From the time of liberation, North Korea had already begun to develop the unique political system that continues today.53 In April 1946, Kim Ch'angman, the head ofthe Propaganda Department ofthe North Korean Communist Party, began to use expressions that reflected the characteristics ofthe North Korean political system. These included "the actualization ofthe inimitable guidance," 30Gwang-Oon Kim "the unique and unified security from mass guidance," "establishment of the subject from guidance," and "the perspective ofthe revolutionary mass line."54
North Korean academics also began to minimize the Soviet Union's role in the liberation ofKorea and the construction ofthe nation. After the 1960s, general histories of North Korea almost completely eliminated the Soviets' activities in the postliberation period. Instead, the North Korean people were written into a central position as the subjects of national construction.55 For their part, the Soviets harshly criticized North Korean academics' negative judgments of the Soviet Union. To emphasize the exploits of the Soviet people who participated in the liberation of Korea and in the construction of North Korean socialism, Soviet writers published a number of studies, including For the Goodwill ofthe Korean People (1965), The Indestructible Goodwill (1971), The Liberation of Korea (1976) , and For Peace in Korea (1985) . All of these works emphatically argue that it was the Soviet Union that "caused the collapse of German fascism and Japanese militarism, and played the decisive role in freeing Korea, China, and the Northeast region from colonial oppression."56
Why do the North Koreans and the Soviets present the same set of events in such opposing, contentious ways? What events and issues caused the discord between North Korea and the Soviet Union in the 1950s? In May 1955 the Soviet Union announced the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (or Warsaw Pact). At the Geneva Summit Conference two months later, Moscow revised its policy of supporting the unified Germany to approve of the "two Germanys," and turned the agreement into reality by establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany in September. The North Korean government reacted with alarm to this chain of Soviet moves-which, existing in a divided state like East Germany, staked out a unified Korea as the foremost political agenda.57 The North Korean government demanded the right to deal with its own issues independently, according to its own convictions and circumstances. But North Korea was fighting an uphill battle, and one that might cost it dearly, against the then-dominant Soviet Union.
The Korean government's anxiety was amplified by the fact that many people looked to the Soviet Union as a source of legitimacy, guidance, and support. Some of these same people disparaged Korea's traditional cultural legacy as backward and held up the Soviet culture as modern and advanced. Others wanted to accede to the Soviets' demands, as the Soviets prioritized education, and were pouring resources into scientific research, and the teaching of Soviet history, geography, and customs. Even some of the Korean Workers' Party members began to support the Soviets. On December 28, 1955, however, Premier Kim Il Sung led the counteroffensive against creeping support of the Soviets by calling upon the party members to "eliminate dogmatism and formalism in ideological activity and stand firm in establishing jucher This major public speech was a preliminary measure to protect the autonomy ofthe North Korean political structure just at the moment that the Soviet Union's taegukchuüi (great power-chauvinism) was penetrating North Korea's sadaejuùi (policy of"serving the great") ofNorth Korea. "Loving and treasuring our own things," Kim emphasized in this campaign, "is patriotism andjuche."5* When the Soviet Union criticized these measures as "anti-Soviet" and "promotion ofnationalism," the North Korean government responded by further articulating its own ideology, theory, and methods.
Stalin's death in 1953 did not end Pyongyang's troubles with Moscow. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign took direct aim at Kim Il Sung, often referred to as "Little Stalin." As the fever for expelling Stalinists swept across socialist countries, Moscow also directed the Korean Workers' Party to resolve the so-called cult ofpersonality around Kim Il Sung. In April 1956, when the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) was opened, Moscow dispatched a group ofrepresentatives, who suggested to their North Korean counterparts that the "cult of personality" issue be addressed and eliminated. The KWP so strenuously opposed what it perceived as the Soviet's taegukchuüi that it ended up in another stand-off with the Soviet Union. In a defiant move that sent a clear message to Moscow, the Congress reelected Kim Il Sung as chairman of the Central Committee of the KWP.
Four months later, the KWP held an all-members meeting that, for the first time in its history, addressed an issue that was not on the agenda. Although its main agenda was to discuss the results of Premier Kim Il Sung's trip to Eastern Europe and the reform of sanitation activities, a few party leaders such as Ch'oe Ch'angik and Pak Ch'angok opposed the KWP policies and questioned the wisdom of not following the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. They further criticized the leadership position that the KWP maintained over the government administrative organs, chigöp tongmaeng (occupation alliance), and the military, and warned against the direction ofeconomic construction, noting that "heavy industry is being favored when the people's lives are hard" and "food does not grow out of machines."59 These issues were closely tied to Soviet aims to integrate the North Korean economy into its larger socialist economic order.
In the mid-1 950s, the Soviet Union was already using the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), established in 1949 as the economic cooperation organization for socialist countries, as a means to subordinate socialist economies under the pretext of "production specialization." The Soviets tried to persuade Pyongyang tojoin the COMECON, and when it refused, criticized it for exhibiting "nationalist inclination," "isolation from the socialist system," and "a closed economic system." North Korea continued to refuse to join the COMECON, mainly because it felt that the organization subordinated the North's economy to that ofthe Soviet Union, although the unequal exchange of Soviet and North Korean commodities was also a continual problem.60 North Korea's motto at the time was "not to live today for today, but to live today for tomorrow," indicating its resolve to endure temporary difficulties in order to build a future free of foreign meddling, by the Soviets or anyone else.
At the National Agricultural Cooperatives Congress of January 1959, held in the midst of the "transition controversy"61 occurring in socialist nations, the KWP set forth-above and beyond the establishment of the socialist system-the "three revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture" as its ongoing revolutionary tasks. In a meeting with Soviet Communist Party Central Committee secretaries Kochelov and Andropov in January 1963, Kim Il Sung defiantly expressed his opposition to the Soviets' taegukchuüi. When both the Soviet Communist Party and the German Socialist Unity Party (which followed Soviet policy) criticized Kim's action, Rodong sinmun, the KWP's official newspaper, publicly announced that the North would pursue a policy of "anti-imperialist struggle" instead of "peaceful coexistence."62
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union forced its policies upon neighboring communist countries. For those nations that elected not to accept the guidance, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to interfere in their internal affairs and to pressure them politically, economically, and militarily. North Korea was no exception. Now that the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and missiles-as Moscow argued to the recalcitrant Pyongyang-there was no need for other socialist nations to expend energy on strengthening their own military. The Soviets discounted North Korea's need for a selfdefense program, and took care to give the impression that they would take responsibility for protecting North Korea. In reality, the Soviets were applying political pressure to a North Korea that was under their nuclear umbrella. The North Korean government responded by emphasizing their right to decide autonomously their internal affairs, such as the selection and establishment of a state socialist system, the preparation and execution ofinternal and external policies, and jurisdictional control over their people and land. The DPRK resisted Soviet interference in its internal affairs and sought a way to exist independently,63 gradually and cumulatively developing the unique political system that privilegesjuche above all other factors.
CONCLUSION
The origins of the North Korean state can be traced back to the Japanese occupation of Korea. Indeed, the complex interplay between the Koreans and foreign powers profoundly shaped Úíqjuche institution that subsequently developed. Ironically, it was the Japanese colonialism that laid the foundation for the state in the north, since it engendered the Korean liberation movement that fought against Japanese colonization of Korea and China, and that later grew into the North Korean state. In the early 1930s, the nationalistic armed struggle within Korea, based on the Independence Army, essentially came to an end, and young socialists, including Kim Il Sung, initiated a qualitative shift in the movement's character by opening a new front in the armed struggle. As Japan expanded its imperial reach into China, Korean struggles for liberation took on a transnational character. Korean communists joined the CCP and collaborated with the Chinese to form the allied Anti-Japanese Armed Forces that fought the common enemy, the Japanese imperial forces, in Manchuria. The Japanese, who were frantically trying to secure China against Western influences, responded with fierce anti-guerilla campaigns. In 1940 these campaigns forced the amalgamated Korean-Chinese military to take shelter in the Soviet Union, which had maintained a neutral stance in the international war between the triple alliance and triple entente. In yet another ironic twist, the forced move gave Kim Il Sung's group an opportunity to expand its transnational alliance to include the Soviets, which after 1945 came to exercise a decisive influence on Korea.
In August 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism, only to be divided along the 38th parallel and occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries, through their occupation policies and the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, now interacted with the Korean liberation movement that sought to regain sovereignty and establish a nationstate. In this divided Korea, the national liberation movement forces were likewise divided. Many tried to gain influence by colluding with either the United States or the Soviet Union, each of which sought indigenous groups to speak on their behalf.
After 1947 it was clear that the establishment of a unified, independent Korean state had failed. In the north and south, individual state apparatuses were formed under the guidance ofthe foreign powers. In the north, the communists seized the propitious circumstances created under the Soviet occupation to take the lead, on February 8, 1946 , in establishing the North Korean Provisional People's Committee as the central governing organization. While supporting each political party and social group, the communists put the people in the forefront of social reform. On August 28,1 946, the NWP was established. On November 3, 1946, the first regular election was held on the Korean peninsula and resulted in the formation of the People's Assembly of North Korea and the North Korean People's Committee. On February 8, 1948 Present-day North Korea continues to use the state title ofDemocratic People's Republic ofKorea, and sovereignty still resides in the Supreme People's Assembly and People's Committee, as it did when the country was first established. Though many of the formal structures have continued, North Korea has nonetheless undergone many changes in the intervening years. While the state was formed on the basis of the ideology of "progressive democracy," it has gradually been replaced, through socialist revolution, by "ourstyle socialism." The character of the government has also changed from the "people's democratic dictatorship" to the "proletariat dictatorship." If key roles in the nascent government were initially played by Kim Il Sung's antiJapanese guerrilla unit and its communist supporters, in cooperation with centrist groups, the government is now run mainly by the former laborers and peasants recruited after liberation, within a basic framework formed by the original anti-Japanese guerrilla unit and its second generation.
One feature that has not changed with time-and is unlikely to alter in the near future-is the concentric power structure predicated on personal loyalty to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II. The anti-Japanese guerrilla unit and its second generation occupy the center ofthe concentric circle. Around them are the party, military, and government institutions, as well as social groups united by tight linkages, all of which function to maintain and strengthen the reproductive structure ofwhat began as the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit. Such is the power structure institutionalized in thejuche North Korea. to destroy the revolutionary ranks from within, because the Japanese were alarmed by the growth of Korean revolutionary forces. From its inception, the organization's counterrevolutionary nature was well known and it was dissolved in July 1932, after the people condemned and rejected it. However, even after its dissolution, cunning Japanese imperialists continued to give the impression that branches of the Minsaengdan had been formed in many places. National chauvinists and factional sycophants were deceived by the ruse and used the anti-Minsaengdan struggle against the extreme Left, which caused great damage to the unity of the revolutionary ranks and the development of the Korean revolution. 23.The "Arduous March" (konan üi haenguri) was the march ofthe main guerrilla unit from Nampaitzu through the border region of Yönan and the Amnok River. It lasted from the beginning ofDecember 1938 until March ofthe following year. After suffering a Japanese suppression campaign, -40 degree weather, food shortages, and combat, the guerrilla unit arrived at its destination. The experience strengthened the unity and confidence of the rank-and-file. 
